OT Threat Landscape 2024

Analysis of Cyber Threats Targeting Industrial Control Systems

30-Page Comprehensive Report

Published: December 2024

Securing Industrial Operations

Download PDF

1. Ransomware Targeting OT Environments

Ransomware remains the most prevalent and impactful threat to industrial environments, with attackers increasingly targeting OT systems directly to maximize operational disruption and extortion leverage.

Notable Ransomware Incidents

Manufacturing Sector Attacks

Case: Global Automotive Supplier Shutdown (March 2024)
LockBit 3.0 ransomware encrypted engineering workstations and SCADA historians at automotive parts manufacturer, disrupting production at 27 plants across 14 countries. Attackers demanded $23M ransom. Company experienced 19-day production shutdown with estimated $180M revenue impact.

Energy Sector Attacks

Case: US Electric Cooperative Incident (July 2024)
Royal ransomware deployed through compromised vendor remote access. Attackers achieved access to distribution SCADA system but were detected before encryption deployment. Incident resulted in 3-day precautionary shutdown affecting 47,000 customers.

Ransomware Evolution

• OT-Aware Targeting: Ransomware groups now identify and specifically target OT assets for maximum leverage
• Double and Triple Extortion: Theft of engineering data, operational data, and customer information before encryption
• Living-off-the-Land: Use of legitimate IT/OT tools (PsExec, WMI, PowerShell) to avoid detection
• Shorter Dwell Times: Average 4.2 days from initial access to encryption (down from 12 days in 2023)

2. Nation-State Threat Activity

Nation-state actors continued pre-positioning in critical infrastructure networks for potential future disruption, with particular focus on electricity, water, and communications infrastructure.

Volt Typhoon (China)

Chinese state-sponsored group focused on pre-positioning in critical infrastructure for potential future disruption operations.

Tactics and Techniques:

• Living-off-the-land techniques to evade detection
• Abuse of SOHO routers and network devices to route traffic and avoid attribution
• Focus on maintaining persistent access rather than immediate exploitation
• Targeting of power grid, water systems, and telecommunications

2024 Activity: Identified in 34 critical infrastructure organizations across US, Canada, Australia, and UK. Average dwell time before detection: 4.7 years.

Sandworm (Russia)

Russian military intelligence (GRU) group with proven capability to disrupt industrial operations.

Historical Context: Responsible for 2015 and 2016 Ukraine power grid attacks and NotPetya destructive malware.

2024 Activity:

• Reconnaissance against European energy infrastructure
• Exploitation of Schneider Electric and Siemens product vulnerabilities
• Testing of industrial protocol manipulation capabilities
• Infrastructure development for future operational access

DPRK (North Korea) Activity

North Korean groups targeting industrial organizations primarily for financial gain through ransomware and cryptocurrency theft.

Groups: Lazarus, Kimsuky, Andariel

Focus Areas: Defense contractors, aerospace, and energy sectors with focus on intellectual property theft and revenue generation.

3. Supply Chain Compromises

Supply chain attacks increased dramatically in 2024, with threat actors targeting industrial vendors, system integrators, and managed service providers as a pathway to multiple downstream victims.

Notable Supply Chain Incidents

Industrial Software Vendor Compromise (April 2024)

Threat actors compromised build environment of SCADA software vendor, injecting backdoor into legitimate software updates distributed to 342 customer sites across North America and Europe. Malware provided persistent remote access to customer OT environments. Discovery occurred 7 months after initial compromise.

Impact: Remediation required coordinated response across hundreds of facilities, SCADA system shutdowns, and forensic investigations. Estimated industry-wide remediation cost: $87M.

System Integrator Breach (September 2024)

Ransomware group compromised major system integrator's internal network, stealing engineering documentation, network diagrams, and remote access credentials for 89 industrial client sites. Attackers used stolen information to target downstream victims with tailored attacks.

Supply Chain Attack Trends

• Vendor Remote Access: 47% of supply chain incidents involved compromised vendor remote access credentials
• Software Supply Chain: Malicious updates, poisoned repositories, and compromised development tools
• Third-Party Integrations: Exploitation of trust relationships between interconnected industrial systems
• Cloud Service Providers: Targeting of OT-focused cloud and managed services providers

4. Vulnerabilities and Exploits

2024 saw significant increase in disclosed vulnerabilities affecting OT products, with particular concern around zero-day exploitation and vulnerabilities in widely-deployed industrial components.

Most Impactful Vulnerabilities

Zero-Day Exploitation

14 confirmed cases of zero-day exploitation in OT environments during 2024, representing significant increase from 3 incidents in 2023. Exploitation primarily attributed to nation-state actors with focus on maintaining persistent access.

5. ICS Protocol Exploitation

Attackers demonstrated increasingly sophisticated understanding of industrial protocols, with capability to manipulate process behavior through protocol-level attacks.

Targeted Protocols

• Modbus TCP: Man-in-the-middle attacks and command injection
• DNP3: Authentication bypass and unauthorized control commands
• IEC 61850: GOOSE message manipulation in electrical substations
• OPC UA: Certificate validation bypasses and session hijacking
• PROFINET: Network reconnaissance and device enumeration

Protocol Attack Capabilities

Publicly available tools for industrial protocol attack capabilities expanded significantly:

• Protocol fuzzing frameworks for vulnerability discovery
• Packet crafting tools for protocol manipulation
• Man-in-the-middle attack frameworks
• Protocol-specific exploit modules in Metasploit and other frameworks

6. Insider Threats

Insider threats continued to pose significant risk to industrial operations, with both malicious insiders and unintentional threats causing security incidents.

Notable Insider Incidents

Water Utility Sabotage (June 2024)

Terminated employee retained remote access credentials, modified chemical dosing parameters at water treatment plant causing temporary water quality issues. Detected through anomalous process behavior alerts. No public health impact.

Manufacturing IP Theft (October 2024)

Process engineer exfiltrated proprietary manufacturing data including PLC logic, HMI designs, and process parameters before departure to competitor. Discovery occurred through data loss prevention alerts.

Insider Threat Indicators

• Access to systems outside normal job responsibilities
• After-hours access without operational justification
• Large data transfers or downloads
• Recent performance issues or disciplinary actions
• Announced departure to competitor

7. Hacktivist Activity

Hacktivist groups increased targeting of industrial infrastructure in support of political and ideological objectives, with particular focus on energy and utilities.

Active Groups

CyberAv3ngers

Pro-Iranian hacktivist group targeting water utilities and gas infrastructure. Notable for defacing HMIs of internet-exposed Unitronics PLCs at multiple US water facilities.

Tactics: Exploitation of default credentials on internet-exposed industrial devices, website defacement, and DoS attacks.

GhostSec and CyberArmy

Groups claiming politically-motivated attacks against industrial targets. Capabilities primarily limited to DDoS and defacement, though growing sophistication observed.

Hacktivist Impact Assessment

While hacktivist capabilities generally lag nation-state actors and sophisticated cybercriminal groups, they pose significant risk due to:

• Unpredictability of targets and timing
• Public disclosure amplifying reputational impact
• Potential to inspire copycats and escalation
• Exploitation of basic security weaknesses for maximum publicity

8. Attack Vectors and Initial Access

9. Recommendations and Mitigations

Critical Security Controls

Detection and Response

• OT Network Monitoring: Deploy industrial IDS/IPS with protocol-aware inspection
• Logging and SIEM: Centralized log collection and correlation across IT/OT
• Backup and Recovery: Offline backups of critical configurations with tested recovery procedures
• Incident Response: OT-specific IR plans with safety considerations and regular exercises

Vulnerability Management

• Maintain asset inventory with software versions and patch status
• Risk-based patching prioritizing critical and internet-facing systems
• Compensating controls (isolation, IPS virtual patching) for unpatchable systems
• Subscribe to ICS-CERT advisories and vendor security notifications

Supply Chain Security

• Vendor security requirements in contracts
• Regular vendor security assessments
• Isolated vendor access zones with monitoring
• Software supply chain verification and testing

10. 2025 Threat Predictions

Anticipated Trends

• AI-Enhanced Attacks: Increased use of AI/ML for reconnaissance, social engineering, and automated exploitation
• ICS-Specific Malware: Development of malware targeting specific industrial control systems and processes
• Cloud and IIoT Targeting: Attacks against cloud-connected OT and Industrial IoT devices
• Regulatory Pressure: Increased enforcement of NIS2, NERC CIP, TSA directives driving compliance requirements
• Geopolitical Tensions: Continued nation-state pre-positioning in critical infrastructure

Emerging Threats

• Quantum computing threats to industrial cryptography (planning horizon: 5-10 years)
• Deepfake and AI-generated social engineering targeting OT personnel
• Attacks against 5G-connected industrial systems and private 5G networks
• Exploitation of convergence between IT, OT, and IoT systems

Conclusion

The 2024 OT threat landscape demonstrated continued evolution and sophistication of threats targeting industrial control systems and critical infrastructure. The 112% increase in incidents reflects both improved detection/reporting and genuine escalation of threat activity.

Organizations must adopt risk-based security programs that balance operational requirements with cybersecurity controls. This includes:

• Executive leadership engagement and adequate resourcing
• Cross-functional collaboration between IT, OT, engineering, and operations
• Implementation of fundamental security controls (segmentation, access management, monitoring)
• Incident response preparedness with OT-specific procedures
• Continuous improvement through regular assessment and adaptation

The threat environment will continue to evolve in 2025, requiring ongoing vigilance and adaptation of security programs to address emerging threats while maintaining operational resilience.